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s h e i l a  McDo n a l d
T H E  WAR AFTER TH E WAR:
FO R T KENT BLOCKHOUSE, 1839-1842
On March 23, 1839, the Maine State Legislature passed a 
resolve rem oving M aine’s m ilitia from the brink of conflict in 
the Aroostook War. On that day, the Fort Kent blockhouse, 
destined to become one of the most enduring symbols of the 
war, was still six m onths away from construction at the conflu­
ence of the Fish and St. John  rivers.
Fort Kent did not rise out of bombast and calls to arms. It 
instead assumed its very strategic location gradually as Maine 
pushed to establish a toe-hold in the territory claimed by both 
Great Britain and the United States under the nebulous terms 
of the Treaty of Paris signed in 1783. Follow ing its construc­
tion in the closing m onths of 1839, Fort Kent stood as the chief 
guardian of American and Maine interests for three years while 
boundary negotiations dragged on in national capitals, and 
while neighboring British and American concerns, who shared 
the shores of the St. John  River, struck an often tense balance of 
power.
In its tenuous position, Fort Kent was at once part of 
several worlds. From a Maine perspective, it was in the middle 
of a large, tim ber-rich area that Maine claimed as hers accord­
ing to the boundary defined in the Treaty of Paris. Practically, 
however, Fort Kent was at the edge of the wilderness, lying a 
great distance north of M aine’s population centers and separ­
ated by miles of virtually uncharted territory w ithout benefit of 
roads or easily usable river routes.
Fort Kent, although far from the rest of the state, was also 
in the middle of a small American settlement, w hich had been 
established around 1817 along the St. John River. This settle­
ment was geographically distinct from the French community 
between G rand Falls and the m outh of the Madawaska. It 
began twelve miles upriver from the m outh of the Madawaska 
and extended another twenty miles to the m outh of the St. 
Francis. Described as “uninhabited and unim proved” prior to
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During the 1839 “war,” the territory north of Fort Fairfield was largely inaccessible by land. The Fish 
River road, built over the next few years, provided a land route to the state’s northernmost fortifica­
tion: the boom and blockhouse at Fort Kent. "A Circular from the Land Office Descriptive of the 
Public Lands of Maine, 1888,” courtesy of the author.
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the Americans’ arrival, this area became defined as the disputed 
territory’s American settlement as tensions grew between 
Maine and New Brunswick in the 1820s.1 As a friendly base of 
operations for Maine officials who took censuses and issued 
land grants along the river, the American settlement helped set 
the stage for the establishment of Fort Kent a decade later.
From a New Brunswick perspective, Fort Kent was not at 
the end of the line. Rather, it stood near a m ajor east-west 
transportation and com m unication route that extended along 
the St. John  River between Saint John, New Brunswick, and 
the m outh of the Madawaska. This route, which Great Britain 
had deliberately settled and secured with Acadian and French- 
Canadian im m igrants, served as a vital link between Canada’s 
maritime and Quebec provinces. Great Britain also claimed the 
territory surrounding the St. John River under terms of the 
Treaty of Paris, and saw Fort Kent as a threat to that claim and 
the rich resource and logistical advantages it held.
M aine’s claims to the territory and resources in the Fish 
and St. John  river areas were subjects of concern in state and 
national capitals long before Fort Kent was built. Extensive 
timber depredations by New Brunswick trespassers had been 
reported there in 1825, and Maine and Massachusetts land 
agents were sent north to investigate. A July 4 celebration in the 
area's American settlement in 1827 resulted in the arrest of a 
local leader by New Brunswick officials. Likewise, a town 
meeting held in 1831 to elect representatives to the Maine 
Legislature resulted in heightened tensions and threats of 
arrest. It was not until 1839 that the fits and starts of a half 
century of contention over the boundary’s location erupted. 
After this brief encounter, Maine began the cumbersome pro­
cess of establishing and sustaining a presence in the disputed 
territory against geographical, historical, and logistical odds. 
These efforts would focus on Fort Kent.
J o h n  Fairfield began his term as governor in 1839 by 
issuing a confidential com m unication to the legislature that 
many men from the British provinces were trespassing exten­
sively and cutting  timber on northern lands claimed by Maine.
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These people, ineluding from fifty to seventy-five on the Fish 
River, ’’not only refuse to desist,” wrote Fairfield, “but defy the 
power of this Government to prevent their cutting timber to 
any extent they please.” - Faced with these depredations, and 
the estimated loss of $ 100,000 worth of timber, the governor and 
legislature authorized $10,000 for Land Agent Rufus M clntire 
to “employ a sufficient force to arrest, detain, and im prison all 
persons found trespassing on the territory of this state as 
bounded and established by the Treaty of 1783.
Arrests, captures, and threats on both sides followed Mcln- 
tire’s arrival w ith a posse of 200 in the territory surrounding the 
Aroostook River. New Brunswick’s Lieutenant Governor John  
Harvey moved troops into the area, protested M aine’s actions, 
and called upon Fairfield to withdraw the forces. Otherwise, he 
wrote, “I must proceed to take m ilitary occupation of the 
territory.’M
Fairfield, believing that “collision is inevitable,” advo­
cated sending a military force of at least 10,000 to “meet the 
troops of Sir John  Harvey and resist his insolent pretensions to 
drive us from our soil.”3 On February 20, 1839, the legislature 
passed a resolve m andating that a m ilitia jo in  the civil posse in 
the territory on the Aroostook and St. John  rivers, “at such 
points as may be best adapted to the object to prevent further 
depredations on the public lands .... ”6 With this, the Aroostook 
War officially began. As Land Agent M clntire later wrote, “ the 
proceedings against individual trespassers, was merged for a 
time, in the agitation of the general question of jurisdiction 
and occupancy."7
In this agitation, actions of both the civil posse and the 
m ilitia  focused on the Aroostook River and the area near the 
eastern international border. Here, troops worked first to estab­
lish posts, defensive works, and a strong presence to dissuade 
trespassers. M aine’s officials were aware of timber depredations 
on the Fish River. Governor Fairfield had suggested to the 
legislature on January 23 that the land agent proceed to the 
river “ if practicable.”8 But the truth was that a m ajor effort was 
not practicable, in large part due to the lack of roads. Despite at
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least two surveys since 1826 to lay out a road from the m outh of 
the Mattawamkeag River to the Fish River, actual construction 
had only progressed as far as Masardis. T hat stretch of road was 
prim arily suited for winter travel and the rem ainder of the 
route north to the Fish River was a treacherous series of water­
ways and portages. On March 8, the legislature, undoubtedly 
aware of the transportation problems, passed a resolve direct­
ing the land agent to expend $10,000 “for the extension of the 
Aroostook Road from the Aroostook to the St. Johns [sic] 
river.”9
The lack of roads to the Fish and St. John  rivers limited the 
posse’s defensive and offensive operations to small groups that 
could move quickly through the largely uncharted wilderness. 
One such group left on February 24 to break up a gang of 
trespassers on the Fish River.10 They likely returned to the posts 
along the Aroostook River following the com pletion of their 
task. They were followed by others who reconnoitered the 
woods between the Aroostook and St. John  to m onitor New 
Brunswick troops.11
By March, these groups had informed Land Agent Mcln- 
tire at Fort Fairfield that provincial and regular forces were 
concentrating at Grand Falls on the St. John  and that a large 
num ber of axes had also been sent up the river. “It is sug­
gested,” wrote M clntire to Governor Fairfield, “ that a move­
ment may be made through the woods from Madawaska to 
some point on the Aroostook above us — possibly through Fish 
River to the Machias while the m ilitia may move directly to this 
post.” 12
W ith these threats from the St. John  and Fish rivers, and 
the prospect of continued timber depredations in the spring, 
Maine officials likely judged that the establishment of a post on 
the Fish River could no longer be delayed. On March 27, 1839, 
Provisional Land Agent Charles Jarvis ordered Captain Alvin 
Nye and twenty-three volunteers from the civil posse and the 
m ilitia to the St. Jo h n .13 Jarvis instructed Nye that his first 
object, after arriving and sending back his teams, was to deter­
mine the best location for a boom to stop the passage of timber
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down the Fish River to the St. John. Nye was then to prepare 
good accom m odations and “calculate the camp as that it may 
be ... used as a block house for defense of the Boom ... against 
the attack of the M ob.” The next priority, instructed Jarvis, was 
the construction of the boom. “Should you be threatened by an 
English Governm ent fo rce/’ continued Jarvis, “you must exer­
cise your own discretion as to resistance .... If threatened by 
such a force you m ust make the best terms you can .... ’’ In no 
event was Nye to cross the St. John. This, Jarvis warned, would 
constitute a violation of the jurisdictional lim its of New 
Brunswick.14
Ironically, and unknow n to Jarvis and Nye, the Aroostook 
War officially ended just as Jarvis was help ing  to stage the 
expedition to the Fish River. On March 25, both sides withdrew 
their m ilitary forces, and the M aine m ilitia  was instructed to 
make preparations for their return from the Aroostook.15 Since 
this inform ation had not yet reached Masardis, Nye and his 
force departed for the Fish River on March 28.
Jarvis learned that the war had ended and the troops had 
been recalled on March 29. A messenger carried a dispatch from 
m ilitia com mander General Isaac Hodsdon ordering the recall 
of the Fish River detachm ent and the troops rem aining at 
M asardis.16 Jarvis, at odds with Hodsdon over cooperation 
between the m ilitia  and the civil posse, asserted that the m ilitia 
members in Nye’s contingent had leaves of absence. He wrote to 
Governor Fairfield: “I may be wrong in this but it appears to 
me im portant in the present posture of affairs, to establish the 
question of our jurisdiction beyond all cavil on the waters of 
the Fish R iv e r/’17
Despite Jarv is’s wishes, Nye’s expedition was notified en 
route of General H odsdon’s orders and was obliged to return to 
the Masardis post. All but two of the m ilitia accepted H ods­
don’s recall, and Jarvis made a hasty trip to Fort Fairfield to 
recruit twenty members of the civil posse to replace them .18 Nye 
departed again for the Fish River w ith instructions from Jarvis 
to clear land adjacent to the post and sow it w ith grass seed. 
This would provide forage for anim als that would be used in
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road building. Rem inding Nye that his post would have to be 
largely self-sufficient in the remote Fish River area, Jarvis 
suggested that potatoes and turnips be planted as soon as 
possible and that Nye should manage the forces under his 
com m and “as if they were in your employ for com m encing a 
large farm, having their arms at hand.’’19
Nye and his troops faced an arduous passage to the Fish 
River. They traveled up  the Little Machias, across the portage 
to the southernm ost of the Fish River lakes, down the lakes and 
thoroughfares — some of which were no longer frozen — and 
down the Fish River.20 Approximately eight and a half miles 
upriver from the m outh of the Fish River, at present-day Sold­
ier Pond, they stopped to establish their post. W riting to Jarvis 
on April 23 from that location (which Nye perhaps facetiously 
called Fort Jarvis), Nye reported that they had completed a 
boom 400 feet in length across the Fish River and that the 
blockhouse was nearly finished. “We shall move in the house 
tom orrow,” he wrote, “it is very strong b u i l t ... of hewn timber 
20 inches thick .... The French have been here and they are glad 
that we Americans are going to have their land .”21
In the same letter, Nye also mentioned to Jarvis the possi­
bility of constructing a boom at the m outh of the river. The 
English, he reported, had surveyed the ground on the opposite 
bank and were p lanning  to build a blockhouse.22 This notion, 
derived from an indeterm inate source, was the seed that led to 
the establishment of Fort Kent. It also began a confused and 
contentious struggle between Maine and New Brunswick, and 
their respective national governments, over the character and 
limits of M aine’s presence in the territory along the St. John  
River.
C o n te n tio n s  stemmed from an agreement forged by 
General Winfield Scott and signed by Governor Fairfield and 
L ieutenant Governor Harvey in March 1839. This accord did 
not establish the international border, but simply ended the 
war and provided a means for the state and province to coexist 
while the boundary was being negotiated. A key part of the
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A reproduction of the Plan of Aroostook and Fish River Road Surveyed and located. July, August and September 1839.  The map 
drawn some time after the date indicated shows the Fort Kent blockhouse as well as the earlier fortification at Soldier Pond.
T h e  d a r k  b l o b s  o n  t h e  s k e t c h  ( g r e e n  i n  t h e  o r i g i n a l )  a r e  
" h a r d w o o d  s w e l l s  o f  l a n d  o v e r  a n d  b y  w h i c h  t h e  r o a d  
p a s s e s " .  M a i n e  S t a t e  L i b r a r y  c o l l e c t i o n s ,  c o u r t e s y  o f  
the author.
agreement was that Maine and New Brunswick would each 
hold in possession some pan ol (he disputed ten d on .  New 
Brunswick thus held die' Madawaska settlement, and Maine, 
the* te ii iton aloni; the* Aroostook River. Neither j jo vm m u ’nt
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conceded the ultim ate right of the other to the territory under 
its jurisdiction. The exact m eaning of this agreement was 
unclear and interpreted variously by each nation to forward its 
aims, especially concerning the territory along the St. John  
River. This area consequently became a focus of contention 
following the Aroostook War.
A m onth after Nye had suggested the advisability of a 
boom at the m outh of the Fish River, a member of the New 
Brunswick m ilitia, sent to investigate the area, reported the 
existence of a force there. John  Sutton related that about 
twenty-five Americans had erected a camp on an island in the 
St. John  opposite the m outh of the Fish River. T he camp had 
two sentries, one at each end of the island, w ith fixed bayonets. 
Sutton apparently spoke with Captain Nye and was informed 
that Nye was empowered to protect and detain timber, and that 
his jurisdiction extended over the whole disputed territory.23
Sutton's report stirred protests by the New Brunswick 
government. In early June Land Agent M clntire met in Bangor 
with Thom as Baillie, the commissioner of crown lands for the 
province of New Brunswick. M clntire acknowledged that Nye 
had exceeded his instructions by moving a portion of the posse 
to the island and reported that he had ordered Nye to confine 
his posse to the Fish River.24
Referring to the March 1839 agreement between Fairfield 
and Harvey that gave jurisdiction of the Madawaska settlement 
to New Brunswick, M clntire told Baillie that he perceived a 
difference of opin ion  between the two governments as to what 
constituted the Madawaska settlement. The Americans, he 
stated, supposed that only the north bank of the St. John  was so 
called (and in fact Nye’s instructions strictly stated that he 
should not cross the St. John to the north).25 Great Britain, on 
the other hand, considered all her subjects on the St. John, both 
to the north and south, above G rand Falls as part of the Mada­
waska settlement. M clntire also reported to Baillie that Maine 
was surveying a road, to be started w ithout delay, from the 
Aroostook to the Fish River, where the posse had built the 
boom and blockhouse. Baillie remarked that the road — indeed
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any American presence on the St. John  — would be considered 
interference w ith British jurisdiction.26
M clntire’s assurances that Nye had been recalled to the 
post eight and a half miles away from the river may have 
appeared to Baillie as an acquiescence to Great B ritain’s 
claims. Maine officials had, however, no intention of acceding 
so readily. M clntire promised the withdrawal not because he 
believed in Great B ritain’s jurisdiction on both sides of the 
river, but because Maine had no means of sustaining and sup­
plying a force ' ‘sufficient to take a post on the St. Jo h n ’s [sic].”27 
As M clntire wrote to Fairfield:
I know it was your wish if practicable to have a party 
on the south bank of the St. Jo h n ’s .... I supposed, 
however that it w ould not be desirable to do so unless 
it could be done effectually and not by a weak force 
that m ight be forced or defeated in their object by 
bands of [timber] trespassers.28
Thus, w hile officials in state, provincial, and national capitals 
fielded com plaints of infractions of the March 1839 agreement 
and negotiators tried to set the international boundary, Maine 
began to position itself on the St. John.
T h e  mission, as far as M aine’s government, land agent, 
and civil posse were concerned, was clear. They had authority 
in the agreement w ith New Brunswick to “protect the timber 
recently cut and to prevent further depredations.” 29 Maine offi­
cials were certainly aware of the other advantages such a move 
w ould bring, however. Over the past fifteen years Maine had 
developed an interest in the St. John  River and hoped to 
embrace the territory w ithin the state’s borders and draw the 
fruits of its fields and forests to the state. A post on the St. John  
would bring those interests one step closer to reality.
Accordingly, Maine, through the land agent, launched 
two efforts to facilitate the posse’s presence on the south bank of 
the St. John  River. In late May 1839, Captain Nye and his posse, 
who had not likely retreated from the St. John  River as p rom ­
ised, constructed a “slight temporary boom stretched across the 
channel, between the Island and southern Maine land .” With
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this, the posse stopped between six and eight hundred tons of 
timber. Convinced of the strategic im portance of the St. John, 
the land agent turned his thoughts to a more substantial boom. 
Charles Jarvis encouraged this thinking. A boom of about 300 
feet connecting the island to the m ainland, supplem ented by a 
guide boom at the upper part of the island to direct every stick 
of timber into the southern channel would serve well, he wrote. 
“Indeed it is difficult to conceive of a situation where a boom 
could be erected on so large a river, w ith so m uch security, at so 
little expense, and at the same time to answer so effectually the 
purpose intended.”30
Maine also opened a road from the Aroostook River at the 
m outh of the Little Machias to the Fish River. M clntire placed 
Jarvis in charge of this daunting  task, which m eant orchestrat­
ing plans, coordinating work crews, and m ustering supplies to 
clear nearly forty-five miles of road. In authorizing money for 
the road work, the Maine legislature had permitted a certain 
latitude in selecting a route. M clntire and Jarvis thus made a 
strategic alteration in the road’s course so that it could meet the 
St. John  at the m outh of the Fish River. Here, it could best serve 
M aine’s purpose of establishing an American posse at the 
m outh of the Fish.31
After four m onths of work from late July through late 
October 1839, Jarvis pronounced the road completed at a cost of 
$8,514. He described his personal inspection tour:
The route was performed with ease, and w ithout the 
slightest accident. From this day, then, may be dated 
the opening of the fine valley of the St. Jo h n ’s to the 
rest of the State, from which until now it has been 
separated by an impassable barrier of forty-five miles 
of unbroken forest.32
T he idea of boom ing the St. John River thus evolved from 
“utterly chim erical,” as Charles Jarvis wrote, to “easy of execu­
tion .”33 W ith a road from the Aroostook to the St. John  in 
place, it w ould not be long before M aine’s civil posse moved to 
take full advantage of a position at the Fish River's m outh. In 
August, a veteran of the posse’s actions in the disputed terri­
tory, Captain Stover Rines, was summ oned to relieve Captain
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Nye at Fish River.34 Rines probably arrived the next m onth and 
began w orking w ith Jarvis to establish the post, which would 
eventually be known as Fort Kent.
R ines’s force at the m outh of the Fish River grew to a total 
of thirty-five by the year s end. T he work that lay ahead for this 
division of the civil posse was especially formidable due to the 
season. As three who “enlisted in to  em ploym ent” there 
described, “when we arrived here [in October], the weather was 
cold and our situation was very uncom fortable on account of 
having no suitable buildings in which to live.”35 Rines, how­
ever, was anxious to complete the necessary business and joined 
the crew in the hard work of establishing the post, with its 
blockhouse, cookhouse and other buildings, and boom.
Once again the posse’s preemptive move to the m outh of 
the Fish River did not escape the attention of British officials. 
T he protests of November 1839, conveyed through diplom atic 
chanhels to Governor Fairfield, did not vary substantively from 
earlier com plaints about M aine’s actions on the St. John. The 
armed posse, asserted British M inister Henry S. Fox, had taken 
on a m ilitary posture “som ething more like a perm anent 
national possession.” The road connecting the Fish River to 
Bangor, together w ith authorized land grants in the disputed 
territory, constituted additional infractions.36
Asked to explain Fox's charges, Fairfield replied in a letter 
to President M artin Van Buren that the posse at the m outh of 
the Fish River had done no th ing  but what was necessary to 
prevent timber depredations, as authorized in the March 1839 
agreement. Further, Fairfield characterized the posse as hired 
labor, not a m ilitia, protecting public property. And finally, 
wrote Fairfield, neither the construction of a road nor the 
m arking and selling of lots represented new initiatives on the 
part of Maine. Rather both activities had been in process in the 
territory for a num ber of years and with “no propriety could ... 
be made a matter of com plaint.”37
Fairfield had cause for indignation, for Maine officials 
were docum enting sim ilar actions by British provincial forces. 
From M aine’s perspective, British troops were taking on an 
overtly threatening tone in the area. Fifty members of the
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British m ilitia, “bearing the queen's arms, and otherwise suit­
ably equipped, headed by a veteran m ilitia captain, made an 
assault in the dead of n ig h t” upon M aine’s new St. John River 
post.38 Rines had also reported that 200 British troops were 
quartered at the head of Temiscouata Lake on the road to 
Lower Canada, and that military buildings were under con­
struction at the foot of the lake and upon either side of the St. 
John at the m outh of the Madawaska.39 John  Baker, a firebrand 
from the St. John  Valley’s American settlement, reported that a 
British armed force on the march to Madawaska had disclosed 
an intention of destroying the Fish River establishment. In 
December, a British officer had employed Baker's neighbor to 
ferry him  to Fish River at night. As they approached the garri­
son, Baker related, they were discovered by the sentinel. The 
officer retreated, saying that the post “should be destroyed by 
New Year’s Day.”40
Ironically, the post at Fish River was likely much less a 
threat than the British imagined. The land agent’s office was 
very short of money to support the activity there, and, despite 
the new road, supplying it was difficult.41 The post was w ith­
out a cannon and Rines was instructed to reduce the force there 
to twenty-five, due to a shortage of funds. M clntire complained 
that he found it “impossible to raise funds to meet the am ount 
of expenses and pay off what is due the men .... ” 42
The juxtaposition of M aine’s posse and the British m il­
itary continued as a point of contention, however, through 
1840. Fox continued to deny that Great Britain had increased 
troops in the territory and called for Maine to retire from the 
valley of the St. John and confine its operations to the Aroos­
took, thereby placing itself in the situation where it stood prior 
to the March 1839 agreement.43 The Maine legislature called on 
the federal government to take military possession of the dis­
puted territory unless the British government made a satisfac­
tory proposal to end the boundary question. The legislature 
appeared once more on the brink of sending troops to war when 
it asserted in a March 1840 resolve that, should the federal 
governm ent’s actions prove disappointing, "it w ill become the
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imperative duty of Maine to assume the defense of our state and 
national honor, and expel from our limits the British troops 
now quartered upon our territory.”44
I n  their own way, M aine’s land agent and the posse at Fish 
River responded to the heightening tensions. Despite the per­
sisting financial problems in his office, Land Agent M clntire 
wrote to Stover Rines in April 1840 that he had decided a larger 
force at Fish River was warranted, “lest it m ight appear we were 
abandoning the post .... ”45 M clntire continued:
You will see by the papers that the object of our post 
at Fish River and the English troops at Madawaska is 
the matter of a controversy. O ur general government 
has taken the right ground, and fully sustained us. It 
is im portant therefore we stand fast where we are, and 
give no new occasion to change the question. I think 
no attem pt will be made to drive you off by force 
unless war is determined on. But it is still im portant 
you keep guarded and not be taken by surprise.46 
Despite these brave words, M clntire concluded the letter w ith a 
surprising announcem ent concerning his cram ped budget and 
his plans for Rines:
Now the booms and buildings have been completed.
I th ink  the business in the future will not require the 
same skill and qualifications and that a m an fully 
com petent to the duties for the com ing season can be 
employed for about two dollars a day. I would not ask 
you to stay for that wage unless you choose to .... If 
you think that compensation not enough, please no t­
ify me immediately and I will send someone to relieve 
you if you wish it, but I wish you to rem ain un til 
relieved. You m ust consult your own feeling and 
wishes in the matter. If you are relieved, your succes­
sor will not receive more than the sum I nam e.”47 
Nevertheless, Rines continued at the Fish River post, supervis­
ing the labors of eighteen m en.48 As m onth after m onth passed 
w ith boundary negotiations stalled in the national capitals,
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tensions eased somewhat, and the day-to-day operations of the 
post assumed more the character of a farm than a fort girded 
against im m inent siege. Rines had directed considerable im ­
provements in the post's agricultural operations, to the extent 
that they could nearly cover all the expenses.49 A settler de­
scribed the conditions there:
I am pleased to testify to the general appearance of 
neatness and propriety observable in the conduct of 
the affairs and especially in the cook and Block­
houses whose appearances show a very proper degree 
of attention to decorum and economy.50 
Reflecting the current lull in tensions, M clntire informed 
Rines that, if matters remained quiet, the num ber at the Fish 
River post could be reduced to twelve once the season’s crop 
was secured.51
Amid this delicate calm, it took only one event along the 
St. John  River to renew the threats of outright conflict. T hat 
event took place in November 1840, when the valley’s Ameri­
cans met at the Fish River settlement to cast their votes in that 
year's presidential election. Provoked by this gathering, New 
Brunswick magistrate Francis Rice, who lived in the province’s 
Madawaska settlement, presented himself at the meeting and, 
by virtue of his authority, attem pted to disperse the people 
there. Rice was consequently threatened and driven from the 
meeting.
Lieutenant Governor Harvey informed Governor Fairfield 
that Rice had been “grossly insulted, threatened with personal 
violence, and obstructed in the discharge of this duty by persons 
professing to be citizens of the State of M aine.” 52 James 
M acLauchlan, the provincial warden of the disputed territory, 
had also been threatened, apparently on another occasion, in 
the discharge of his duties by “the person in charge of the armed 
posse stationed at Fish River.”53 Fairfield replied that “instead 
of finding the acts against Rice reprehensible,” he could “only 
wonder at [Rines’s] forbearance in not causing him  [Rice] to be 
arrested and subjected to trial and punishm ent.”54 These 
attacks on Rice and M acLauchlan provoked the governor
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general of the British provinces to move troops to the Mada- 
waska settlement to “give support to the civil authorities of that 
settlem ent.”55 A significant step, this move represented the first 
time — rum ors and American reports to the contrary — that 
British troops openly established residence in the Madawaska 
settlement. Personally, Harvey considered the actions a viola­
tion of the M arch 1839 agreement and argued for a provincial 
civil force, sim ilar to that at Fish River. He was overruled, 
however, and the m ilitary troops stayed. Fairfield lost no time 
in forw arding the letters between himself and Harvey to Presi­
dent Van Buren along with the following harsh words:
Maine is again subjected to the m ortification of hav­
ing foreign troops quartered upon her territory ....
T hat the alleged causes are entirely insufficient to 
justify so direct and palpable a breach of the subsist­
ing agreement between the authorities of this State 
and the Lieut. Governor of the Province of New 
Brunswick is clear .... I trust that the Executive 
Governm ent of the United States will forthw ith take 
measures to ensure the immediate w ithdrawal of 
these troops from our territory, or to expel them .56 
T he federal governm ent’s reactions to M aine’s indigna­
tion brought little more direct action than past responses to 
flare-ups along the St. John  River. President Van Buren 
assured M aine’s governmental officials that the United States 
and London were in the process of negotiating for a boundary 
survey to end the dispute, but past delays left Governor Fair- 
field and his successor, Edward Kent, decidedly pessimistic.57
Follow ing a comprehensive committee report, the legisla­
ture echoed Governor Kent’s concerns and once again called 
upon the federal government to fulfill its obligations and 
m aintain  M aine’s rights to the territory by negotiation or arms. 
T he federal governm ent did, in fact, arrange for its troops to 
take over the forts at the Aroostook and Fish rivers and relieve 
the civil posses in August 1841. Prior to that time, however, 
M aine’s financially cramped land agent’s office received help 
from another quarter in sustaining the civil posses in the 
territory.
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T h a t  help came from Massachusetts when, in February 
1841, the land agents of M aine and Massachusetts jointly 
appointed Zebulon Ingersoll to “superintend” the protection 
of public lands on the St. Jo h n .58 A lthough Massachusetts still 
owned significant property in the disputed territory, the com­
m onwealth had not contributed to financing any fortifications. 
When finally asked by the Maine land agent in 1841, however, 
Massachusetts Land Agent George Coffin “signified his entire 
willingness to defray one-half of all expenses necessary for the 
p ro tec tio n  of the p u b lic  p roperty  on the no rth easte rn  
frontier.”59
Ingersoll’s work led him  directly to evaluate the posses at 
Fort Fairfield and Fish River. He prom ptly reduced the force at 
Fort Fairfield, which had recently numbered as h igh  as thirty- 
five, to a captain and three men, because the area around the 
Aroostook River was under no immediate danger from tres­
passers. The post at Fish River, however, was sustained at its 
current strength of one captain and ten men, because of its 
im portance in com m anding a large territory subject to exten­
sive depredations.60
Fort Kent, as the post at Fish River came to be called in 
1841, was im portant as a symbolic and tangible statement of 
M aine’s land claims in the volatile atmosphere along the river. 
T he sensitivity of this position was not lost on either Land 
Agent Elijah L. H am lin, who had replaced Rufus Mclntire, or 
on Massachusetts Land Agent George Coffin. T he pair visited 
the fort in July 1841 and learned that the British at Madawaska 
were about to make a tax assessment upon all inhabitants of the 
St. John, including those at Fort Kent. Ascertaining that the 
American citizen John Baker had been once again arrested by a 
New Brunswick officer, H am lin wrote that “under these cir­
cumstances, we did not think it advisable to make any deduc­
tion from the force at Fort Kent.”61
Coffin echoed H am lin 's analysis of the post’s im portance 
and, in a letter to Massachusetts Governor John  Davis, gave a 
description of the civil posse’s works there:
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At this place is a Block House built of hewn timber 
(but not secured by a stockade), a cook house, stables, 
and other convenient buildings, with the necessary 
utensils suitable for farm ing purposes, and about 
two hundred acres of land under good cultivation ... 
and is stocked w ith w orking oxen, horses, and about 
forty head of swine .... This post is protected by a 
Civil Posse, consisting of a Captain and ten men and 
effectually protects the booms across the river Saint 
Johns and over the m outh of the Fish River, thereby 
securing from depredation all the timber on the St. 
Johns and Fish Rivers above this station, conse­
quently this is a very im portant command, and 
ought to be supported at all hazards.62
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H am lin dispatched a specially deputized sheriff to Fort Kent 
with instructions to arrest anyone attem pting to collect the 
tax.63 The dire reports from the St. John  brought renewed calls 
for federal troops to take possession of Forts Kent and Fairfield.
This time, the request was granted. On August 14, General 
Winfield Scott directed Brigadier General Eustis at Hancock 
Barracks in H oulton to select two companies of the First Regi­
ment of Artillery to relieve the armed civil posse at Forts Fair- 
field and Kent. President John  Tyler’s objects in m aking this 
move, wrote General Scott, were to relieve the state of Maine 
from the burden of keeping the posse, to preserve the tranqu il­
ity of the territory while negotiations were pending, and to 
protect the timber on the south shores of the St. John. T o allay 
British concerns that the federal move to the territory signaled 
heightened aggression, Scott instructed Eustis that the presi­
dent’s “pacific objects ought to be generally known on both 
sides of the river St. Jo h n .’’64
Captain Lucien B. Webster, com m anding Company C of 
the First Artillery, arrived at Fort Kent on September 17, 1841, 
after an eleven day march from H oulton. Rines and one addi­
tional member of the posse at Fort Kent stayed under the state’s 
employ to protect the state’s interests, which prim arily con­
cerned timber harvesting in the territory.65
Webster and his company lost no time in trying to upgrade 
both the physical and logistical situations at Fort Kent. The 
blockhouse was the only building there, serving as both the 
fort’s defensive work and quarters for the men. Webster re­
ported that, upon his arrival, the blockhouse was in “an u n ­
finished state,’’ needing new floors and other repairs.66 None­
theless, it was comfortable, according to Webster. He m ain­
tained the use of the blockhouse’s upper story and attic as 
quarters, and the lower story as a guard house and clothing 
store, while he concentrated on building a new officers’ quar­
ters, which was suitable for use by April of the following year.67
Webster's most immediate concern, however, was trans­
portation and com m unication between Fort Kent and the rest 
of the state, a fam iliar and as yet unsolved problem for virtually 
every Maine civilian and military concern that had settled in
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the area. T he forty-five mile road from the Aroostook River to 
Fort Kent, described so glowingly by Charles Jarvis two years 
before, was, according to Webster, nearly impassable for loaded 
wagons and dangerous to express riders because it passed 
through a dense forest, over streams roughly bridged, and 
across great distances “w ithout a single hum an habitation or 
shelter of any k ind .”68 As a result of the road’s poor quality, 
wrote Webster to Assistant Adjutant General R. Anderson, “we 
are thus in a measure cut off from all com m unication with the 
rest of the U. States, except that obtained by passing through 
the British Provinces.” Webster estimated that a good road 
from Fort Kent to the term ination of the state road at Masardis 
would cost $57,000 — about $1,000 per m ile.69
The lack of postal service to Fort Kent proved to be another 
vexing deficiency. The fortification had to rely on the English 
post office twenty-six miles downriver in Madawaska, or the 
federal garrison at H oulton, 110 miles away. Webster described 
Fort Kent as “more inaccessible and in a region of fewer 
resources than any other in the U nion ,” a situation made more 
deplorable by the proxim ity of “civil and military authorities 
of a foreign pow er.”70
Tensions between Fort Kent and that “foreign pow er” had 
lessened considerably w ith the arrival of the federal troops. 
Rather than viewing Webster and his Com pany C as a stronger 
threat than Rines and the civil posse, the government of New 
Brunswick, according to Massachusetts Land Agent George 
Coffin, “considered them as having a tendency to quiet the 
borders.” 71 Webster also reported that “public feeling through­
out this whole line has not for years presented so quiet and 
peaceable an aspect as at present.”72 He apparently added his 
own diplom atic touch as well, extending courtesies to the 
nearby English officers. T he costs of his efforts prom pted him  
to request that Fort Kent receive double rations since there were 
no hotels in  the vicinity and because Webster was expected to 
extend his courtesies to English officers stationed at the “four 
posts in our vicinity” who “have manifested every attention 
and good feeling towards us, and are frequently our guests.”73
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Despite its remoteness from sources of support in Maine, 
Fort Kent evidenced other signs of growth. “Ow ing to the new 
and unm ilitary condition of the post when taken possession by 
the U. S. troops, the Company have had an unusual quantity of 
fatigue duty to attend to ,” wrote Webster at the inspection of 
the post in September 1842.74 He reported the evidence of their 
labors: new floors in the blockhouse; new quarters for the 
officers; log huts for the company's laundresses; a hospital; and 
a post school for the children of some ten soldiers. There was 
also a “very good post garden.”75
O n  a diplom atic front, Secretary of State Daniel Webster 
had taken a new course in the boundary negotiations. Con­
vinced that the entire process must be salvaged from the in tri­
cate maze of proposals and counterproposals that had dom i­
nated the negotiations since the conclusion of the Aroostook 
War, Webster began setting the stage at the end of 1841 for a 
boundary by compromise. Maine officials had consistently 
opposed a com promise line, insisting that the boundary as 
described in the Treaty of Paris was the state’s true right. In 
May 1842, however, the Maine legislature agreed to Webster's 
proposal to appoin t commissioners to act on behalf of the state 
in negotiations on a compromise line.
After a m onth-long exchange, Webster, British envoy Lord 
Ashburton, and the commissioners from Maine and Massachu­
setts reached a settlement. On August 9, 1842, Webster and 
Ashburton signed the treaty that would establish the interna­
tional boundary as it is known today, and declare the right of 
free navigation on the St. John  for both nations. Factions in 
Maine and New Brunswick and their respective national 
governments each felt that justice had not been fully served, but 
the agreement, known commonly as the Webster-Ashburton 
Treaty and formally as the Treaty of W ashington, was pro­
claimed by both countries on November 10, 1842.
The process of effecting a new international border, where 
formerly only a river had divided the people of the St. John 
Valley, placed Fort Kent once more in a difficult position. The
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first troubles came w ith a challenge by New Brunswick au thor­
ities to the treaty itself, when they arrested American settler 
Daniel Savage from an island south of the international border 
in  M arch 1843. Captain Webster sent Fort Kent troops to pro­
tect Savage and  arrest the New Brunswick constable who held 
him . New Brunswick officials justified the arrest by arguing 
that the W ebster-Ashburton Treaty had not been sanctioned by 
an act of Parliam ent and was consequently n u ll. T he governor 
of New Brunswick later overruled local officials, and Webster 
regarded the difficulties as settled.76 American residents in the 
area still perceived a threat, however, if not from New Bruns­
wick officials then from Canadian lum berm en who had begun 
w orking in the area. They expressed their fears in September 
1843 when rum ors of a recall of troops from Fort Kent spread 
through the valley.
You are probably aware ... that there is no organized 
“civil au thority” whatever anywhere in  this vicinity 
and we are satisfied ... that the “T roops” have been 
the means of suppressing m uch strife and perhaps 
bloodshed. But if the country was in any dangerous 
state then, it is m uch more so now .... T he Country 
literally swarms w ith  strangers the principal part of 
whom  are foreign lumbermen well known to be a 
lawless, reckless class of men and very dangerous.77 
They reported about 200 such men on the St. Francis River, 
who had been heard to threaten Fort Kent. Under these circum ­
stances, the settlers urged the continued occupation of the fort, 
at least un til the state could send a sufficient “civil force” to 
protect them .78
Wishes of local settlers to the contrary, Webster and his 
troops, along w ith  the troops at Fort Fairfield, were w ithdrawn 
under the recom m endation of General W infield Scott in  Sep­
tember 1843. Four companies were left at Hancock Barracks in 
H oulton  “ to meet any border exigency that m ight occur higher 
up  the frontier.” 79 Scott gave three m ilitary reasons for the 
w ithdrawal: his troops were needed on the seaboard for the 
preservation of im portant works; there was noth ing  of sim ilar
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im portance on either the Aroostook or Fish rivers worthy of a 
garrison; and the posts were distant, difficult, and expensive to 
supply, especially Fort Kent, which could not be m aintained 
except at the cost of a road and bridges.80 The Secretary of War 
added that the federal government should not be asked to 
“perform the police duty of guarding the property of a state or 
of individuals from expected trespasses .... ’’81
A state legislative committee reminded federal authorities 
of other valid reasons for retaining the Fort Kent garrison: the 
‘ ‘unchecked lawlessness’ ’ am ong certain elements of the border 
area’s population; the great distance between Fort Kent and 
H oulton; the French popu la tion ’s lack of experience with 
American laws; the need for protection from “powerful and 
armed bands of foreign marauders, encamped upon a weak and 
defenseless border’’; and finally, the constitutional obligations 
of the federal governm ent.82 Maine will vote “regiments w ith­
out stint for ... wherever the honor of the country demands 
efforts and sacrifices,’’ the report concluded. “For herself, she 
now asks the small force of forty men to protect her citizens 
from the threatened invasion of ten times that num ber of law­
less foreigners.’’83 W ith that, the Maine legislature passed a 
resolve on March 16, 1844, that the occupation of Fort Kent by 
U. S. troops was necessary to protect the citizens and property of 
Maine against foreign aggression. T he legislature requested 
that the governor forward both the report and the resolve to 
President Tyler.84 The actions of Maine yielded results: Federal 
troops stayed at Fort Kent — at least until the following year.
F o llo w in g  Fort Kent’s military use, the blockhouse went 
from federal, to state, to private ownership between 1845 and 
1858. In 1891, after the blockhouse had fallen into disrepair and 
disuse, the Maine legislature authorized $300 to purchase the 
structure, resolving to repair and preserve it.85 T his act was the 
first known state-funded attem pt to preserve an historic fortifi­
cation in the state of Maine, and was likely the earliest effort by 
the state generally to undertake the preservation of an historic 
building with public monies. The precise motives are not part 
of the historical record, but certainly the efforts to preserve the
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Fort Kent blockhouse, however, consciously driven, were well- 
placed and appropriate for a state-funded initiative.
Fort Kent played a key role in form ing M aine’s boundaries 
as they are known today. It protected the state’s rights to a vital 
tim ber resource and provided a point of departure for both a 
state and national presence in the area. Fort Kent also resulted 
in the construction of a road which, although slow in full 
realization, brought settlers into the northern portion of Maine 
and eventually provided an im portant link to lands and popu­
lation centers to the south. Most im portantly, Fort Kent’s pres­
ence in the harsh and remote environment along the St. John 
River sustained, with persistent determination, M aine’s claims 
to the disputed territory during  the critical period between the 
Aroostook War and the Webster-Ashburton Treaty.
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